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APPELLANT/PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF
Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Questions
Opposition for Certiorari
I.

Does a mistake on an unsigned reminder notice effect a
decrease in the rental rate for storage units?

II.

Were the remedies taken by and afforded to the Plaintiff
for Defendant's failure to pay the full amount of rent in
accordance with law?

III.

The Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to review
the postjudgment actions of the trial court, which actions
were in accordance with law.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I

A PURPORTED MISTAKE ON AN UNSIGNED REMINDER NOTICE DOES EFFECT
A DECREASE IN THE RENTAL RATE FOR STORAGE UNITS WHEN RELIED UPON BY
THE APPELLANT.
To fully understand

the Respondent's claim of a purported

"Mistake" an issue of material fact, and the asserted premise from
which

they stand

in requesting

this Court

to deny Certiorari.

Therefore, affirming reformation of the contract, to a previous rentrate in violation of the contractual notification requirements, and
to affirm enforcement of the Respondent's omitted language in the
written and

required

to be signed Rental Agreement

as to the

notification requirements, a required threshold, prior to becoming
effective, for rent-rate decreases one must import fault upon:
Either the Appellant, who was required to sign the Rental
Agreement dated June 12, 1987 (App-42) as a condition of
renting the Respondent's storage units Nos. 143 and 144,
or the Respondent who properly noticed the Appellant for
the appropriate rent-rate decrease to be effective May 1,
1988f (App-4) and to be effective retroactive for the month
of October 1988, and to commence on a going forward basis
from November lf 1988, (App-17),
for the responsibility of the purported alleged mistake and the
-1-

Respondent's ignorance of their contractual duties of responsibility
set forth in their own required-to-be-signed Rental Agreement. Some
noted authorities, as listed below, discuss the issue of reformation.
Professor Corbin on Contracts, Chapter

29

$

615, page 743.

Dougherty v. Lion Fire Ins. Co., 84 N.Y.S. 10 (New York 1903).
Moreover, the issue of "mistake" is analyzed with great clarity in
Moreno Mut. IRR. Co. v. Beaumont IRR. Dist., 211 P.2d 937, 938 (Cal.
1949).
Applying these rules to the case at bar, no mistake of law is
claimed.

The Second—the

Respondent

claims

in the Attorney's

prepared and canned Affidavit of Ms. Audrey Hooper dated April 29,
1989, par. Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7 (App-5 and 5A), that a mistake was
made proclaiming knowledge to the Appellant, wherein the Appellant
would

be

required,

to

correct

the

Respondent's

error.

The

Respondent's affiant, Ms. Audrey Hooper's Deposition taken dated
April 29, 1989, clearly controverts and declares under oath just the
opposite to her Attorney's prepared and canned Affidavit for the same
day, at the same time, by the same person. (App-6 and 6A) lines 24,
25, and lines 8 through 13*

The Third is the intention grounds

elaborated in length by the Respondent which does not apply in this
case under

the exception italicized, 17 Corpus Juris Secundum,

Contracts $ J 135, 144 pages 486-487, and 499.

Applying this rule

to the case at bar the Appellant's documents (App-3, 8, 9, and 10)
without any response, "just put the copies into the file," (App-6A
lines 20 and 21) and the Appellant's responses

(App-16, and 19

through 27) without any response renders the Respondent's asserted
claim of "Mistake" to no mistake in the legal sense.

Therefore, no

reformation is entitled and, of course, no alleged default exists for
-2-

the period of time May 1988 through September 10f 1988, nor any other
period of time resulting from the appropriate amortizations that were
recognized, received, and accepted by the Respondent.

See also

McMahon v. Tanner, 249 P.2d 506 (Utah 1952), and Sine v. Harper, 222
P.2d 580, 581 (Utah 1950).
ISSUE II
THE REMEDIES TAKEN BY AND AFFORDED TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE
ALLEGED DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PAY THE FULL AMOUNT OF RENT WERE NOT
IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
The Respondent has brought to the forefront the Utah Code
Section 38-8-3, claiming protection and enforcement on the asserted
premise

that there is an established default by the Appellant

reiterated many times throughout their proclamated claim, Motion for
Summary Judgment (R at 56 par. 16, 23, and 30). This specifically
describes the landlord's statutory duties of responsibility that must
be followed prior to any enforcement action against the tenant, which
is specifically described in Utah Code Sections 38-8-2, 38-8-3(2),
and 38-8-3(3).

No place in the record is there any compliance with

these statutory duties of responsibility by the landlord as asserted
by the affiant, Mr. Steven J. Nelson, Affidavit par, 6 (App-14A) and
notarized by his Attorney, a beneficiary to the fraud; further
asserted by the affiant, Ms. Audrey Hooper

(APP-5 and 5A) and

notarized by her attorney, a beneficiary to the fraud, for the period
of time May 1988 through September 10, 1988, during the first period
of the Appellant's lock-up , or any other period of time prior to the
commencement of the lawsuit by the landlord, January 20, 1989.
"There is no question under Otah cases that a violation of
the duty set by the statutes gives rise to an action for
damages, not in an action under the Forcible Entry and
Detainer Statutes but as a separate tort."

-3-

King v. Firm, 285 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1955) . Therefore, the Appellant's
properly

filed counterclaim

for trover and conversion, and the

establishment of the Appellant's lien should not be dismissed with
prejudice (R at 69). The self-help remedies taken by, and afforded
to, the Respondent for the alleged Appellant's failure to pay the
full amount of rent were not in accordance with law, and must not be
denied

the Appellant

in

the

Respondent's

adamant

request

for

Certiorari denial.
ISSUE III
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE
POSTJUDGMENT ACTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH ACTIONS WERE NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
The Respondent asserts that since the Appellant is acting ProSe in this action, he is not entitled to, or should not be afforded,
his U.S. Constitutional Rights—so of course, the Court of Appeals
disregarded

and

ignored

them

too, by

refusing

to

review

the

Appellant's Amended Docketing Statement. Nevertheless, that does not
bind

this Court

in

ignoring

them,

i.e.,

the Appellant's U.S.

Constitutional Rights, whereby the Appellant has been unlawfully
incarcerated under the color—the alleged Contempt of Court—the
improperly

noticed,

the

unlawfully

claimed,

the

immediately

instituted, Supplemental Relief Motion, during the properly noticed
Oral Arguments for bonding on Appeal September 26, 1989, at 9 a.m.
See Amended Docketing

Statement, and refer

to the Respondent's

admission Post-Judgment Events paragraph No. 11.

Then, review the

secret document and the alluded-to verbal conversations (attached)
that have been going on between the trial court and Mr. Lynn Pe
Heward, in conspiring

to manipulate

(strip the Appellant) with

unlawful enforcement actions against the Appellant, in violation of
-4-

appropriate "Notice - Due Process" of his U.S. Constitutional Rights
14th Amendment.

See Nelson v. Jacobson, 669 P.2d 1212 (Utah 1983),

Utah Judicial Code Section No. 78-33-8 Supplemental Relief that
declares " . . .

the court shall on reasonable notice . . . " Open

Court unprepared, unrepresented, does not constitute
notice.

See also Graham v. Sawaya, 632 P.2d

853

reasonable

(Utah 1981).

Moreover, the U.S. Constitution 5th Amendment should have protected
the Appellant in civil actions as pleaded, par Nos. 9 and 10 of
Amended Docketing Statement.

See also First Federal Sav. & Loan.

Ass'n of Salt Lake City v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984). The
alleged Contempt of Court was illegal too.

See Amended Docketing

Statement Par. Nos. 9 through 16, commingled with Thomas v. Thomas,
569

P.2d

1121

postjudgment

(Utah

1977).

There

is

no question

that

the

actions were not in accordance with law, and the

Appellant was unlawfully incarcerated under the color—the alleged
Contempt of Court—in violation of the law, causing great damages
upon the Appellant, his spouse, and his children, who continually
suffer from this reckless and wanton act.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons this case should be reversed and
remanded to trial and a judgment entered in favor of the Petitioner,
or in the alternative, grant the Petitioner's request for Certiorari.
Dated this

31

~~~

day of

^Jft/w

, 1990.

Respectfully submitted

fain*- ^e^m.

William L. Echols
Defendant, Appellant and
Petitioner, Pro-Se
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Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing
Appellant/Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Questions Opposition
for Certiorari was hand delivered to Lynn P. Heward #1479f Attorney
for the Plaintiff and Respondent, 923 East 5375 South #E, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84117, on this

31 -^

day of

J#/w

The sum of three copies as agreed.

William L. Echols

, 1990.
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1

after this had originally happened, because, as I

2

remember correctly—

3

and if I remember correctly, I did send a letter in

4

between this that I told Mr. Echols that he was aware

5

that the rents were supposed to be forty—

6

No.

Like I said, it's been a w h i l e —

As a matter of fact, I wrote and told

7

him there had been a mistake made on the check, because

8

they sent me the check for $55 and the rent was

9

supposed to be $80 for the two units.

10
11
12
13

Q

So, as you recall, there was another letter

before this one?
A

Yes.

There was one other letter that I did

send out.

14

As a matter of fact, I believe I sent it to

15

your mother-in-law, if I remember correctly—or to the

16

address I had on the check.

17

Q

It does refer in this letter--Exhibit

18

Number 3—apparently, of "...a mistake made on your May

19

statement which I brought to your attention at the

20

time I received your mother-in-law's check for $55."

21

That bringing to the attention would be that prior

22

letter?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

You did not talk to Mr. Echols personally?

25

A

No, I did not.

LILLIAN S. HONSAKER - CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER
Salt Lake City, Utah 84094
(801) 571-0769
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1

I met Mr. Echols—

Actually, he came in and

2

paid the rent after we had raised rents, and he did

3

bring me in a check at that time,

4

Q

And that was the first time you recall

5

meeting him?

6

A

7

Mr. Echols.

8

Q

Did you talk to him after that time?

9

A

No.

Yes.

That was the first time I had met

I never actually talked to him.

He

10

would send me letters back, but I don't recall him

11

coming in.

12

Q

Personally?

13

A

No.

14

Q

Did anything else happen during this time

15
16

Or by phone?

No.

besides your sending out these two letters?
A

No.

Except—

I'm trying to remember.

He

17

sent me several letters that were telling me I was

18

not—it was illegal for me to do this type of thing.

19

And I would just call Becky, who was the

20

secretary, when I would receive his letters, and just

21

put the copies into his file.

22
23
24
25

MR. ECHOLS:

What type of thing are you talking

about?
THE WITNESS:

Well, you would send me these

letters and you would tell me what I was doing was

LILLIAN S. HONSAKER - CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER
Salt Lake City, Utah 84094
(801) 571-0769

38-8-2

LIENS

occupants who are to have access to the facility for the purpose of storing
and removing personal property. No occupant may use a self-service storage facility for residential purposes. The owner of a self-service storage
facility is not a warehouseman as used in Subsection 70A-7-102(l)(h). If
an owner issues any warehouse receipt, bill of lading, or other document
of title for the personal property stored, the owner and the occupant are
subject to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the provisions of this chapter do not apply.
History: C. 1953, 38-8-1, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 171, § 1.

38-8-2. Lien against stored property — Attachment and
duration — Search for financing statement prerequisite to enforcement of lien.
Where a rental agreement, as defined in Subsection 38-8-1(6), is entered
into between the owner and the occupant, the owner of the self-service storage
facility and his heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns have
a lien upon all personal property located at the self-service storage facility for
rent, labor, or other charges, present or future, in relation to the personal
property and for expenses necessary for its preservation or expenses reasonably incurred in its sale or other disposition under this chapter. The lien
attaches as of the date the personal property is brought to the self-service
storage facility and continues so long as the owner retains possession and
until any default is corrected, or a sale pursuant to a default is conducted, or
the property is otherwise disposed of to satisfy the lien. Before taking enforcement action under Section 38-8-3, the owner shall determine if a financing
statement filed in accordance with Section 70A-9-401, et seq. has been filed
with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code concerning the property to be sold or otherwise disposed of.
History: C. 1953, 38-8-2, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 171, § 2; L. 1984, ch. 66, § 163.
Amendment Notes. — The 1984 amendment substituted "with the Division of Corpo-

rations and Commercial Code" for "in the office
of the lieutenant governor" in the last sentence; and made minor changes in style,

38-8-3. Enforcement of lien — Notice requirements — Sale
procedure and effect.
A claim of an owner which has become due against an occupant and which
is secured by the owner's lien may be satisfied as follows:
(1) No enforcement action may be taken by the owner until the occupant has been in default continuously for a period of 30 days.
(2) After the occupant has been in default continuously for a period of
30 days, the owner may begin enforcement action if the occupant has been
given notice in writing. The notice shall be delivered in person or sent by
certified mail to the last known address of the occupant, and a copy of the
notice shall, at the same time, be sent to the sheriff of the county where
the self-service storage facility is located. Any lienholder with an interest
in the property to be sold or otherwise disposed of, of whom the owner has
562
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38-8-3

knowledge either through the disclosure provision on the rental agreement or through the existence of a validly filed and perfected UCC-1
financing statement with the Division of Corporations and Commercial
Code, or through other written notification, shall be included in the notice
process as set forth in this section.
(3) This notice shall include:
(a) an itemized statement of the owner's claim showing the sum
due at the time of the notice and the date when the sum became due;
(b) a brief and general description of the personal property subject
to the lien, which description shall be reasonably adequate to permit
the person notified to identify the property; except that any container
including, but not limited to, a trunk, valise, or box that is locked,
fastened, sealed, or tied in a manner which deters immediate access
to its contents may be described as such without describing its contents;
(c) a notification of denial of access to the personal property, if such
denial is permitted under the terms of the rental agreement, which
notification shall provide the name, street address, and telephone
number of the owner or his designated agent whom the occupant may
contact to respond to the notification;
(d) a demand for payment within a specified time not less than 15
days after delivery of the notice; and
(e) a conspicuous statement that, unless the claim is paid within
the time stated in the notice, the personal property will be advertised
for sale or other disposition and will be sold or otherwise disposed of
at a specified time and place.
(4) Any notice made under this section shall be presumed delivered
when it is deposited with the United States postal service and properly
addressed with postage prepaid.
(5) (a) After the expiration of the time given in the notice, an advertisement of the sale or other disposition shall be published once a
week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the county where the self-service storage facility is located. The
advertisement shall include:
(i) a brief and general description of the personal property
reasonably adequate to permit its identification as provided for
in Subsection (3)(b); the address of the self-service storage facility and the number, if any, of the space where the personal property is located; and the name of the occupant and his last known
address; and
(ii) the time, place, and manner of the sale or other disposition, which sale or other disposition shall take place not sooner
than 15 days after the first publication,
(b) If there is no newspaper of general circulation in the county
where the self-service storage facility is located, the advertisement
shall be posted at least ten days before the date of the sale or other
disposition in not less than six conspicuous places in the neighborhood where the self-service storage facility is located.
(6) Any sale or other disposition of the personal property shall conform
to the terms of the notice provided for in this section.
563
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TELEPHONE 264-8040
AHEA CODE 301

August 14f 1989
Fourth Circuit Court
98 North Center
American Fork, Utah 84 003
Attention: Sue.
Re: American vs. Echols
Dear Sue:
In accordance with our telephone conversation of August
14, 1989, enclosed please find my check in an indeterminate sum
not greater than $15 as well as the following documents concerning
the referenced matter: Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings,
as well as a stamped envelope and a copy of the Motion and Order
in Supplemental Proceedings to be used for serving the defendant.
I would appreciate it if you would please take care of
the filing and execution of these documents as appropriate, and
then please return the copies of the Motion and/or Order in
Supplemental Proceedings to me in the said stamped envelope for
service on the defendant.
Thank you for your help and consideration.
Yours very truly,

LYNN P. HEWARD
Attorney at Law

